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ABSTRACT 
 
 
YOUNGSUK YOOK: Stock Price Informativeness and Corporate Spinoffs 
(Under the direction of Paolo Fulghieri) 
 
 
    This paper empirically investigates the role of stock price informativeness in the real 
sector using a sample of corporate spinoffs from 1975 to 2001. In the first part, I examine the 
impact of stock price informativeness on a firm’s managerial decisions and operating 
performance. I find that changes in informativeness around the spinoff are positively related 
to the subsequent changes in operating performance of the parent firms. Those firms with 
increased informativeness make significant adjustments to improve investment efficiency 
following the spinoff. The results suggest that managerial investment decisions serve as one 
of the channels through which informed trading in the market contributes to firm 
performance. In the second part, I examine the changes in CEO compensation structure 
around the spinoff and investigate how it relates to stock price informativeness and operating 
performance. I find that firms increase the proportion of stock-based compensation 
significantly following spinoffs. These changes in stock-based compensation are positively 
associated with changes in subsequent firm performance, suggesting that stock-based 
compensation is an effective tool in structuring managerial incentives. I also find that 
informativeness-performance association stays positive and significant, controlling for the 
change in compensation structure around the spinoff. In sum, my findings provide support 
for the view that informed trading matters to the real sector. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
    This paper empirically investigates the role of stock price informativeness in the real 
sector using a sample of corporate spinoffs from 1975 to 2001. The paper consists of two 
parts. In the first part, I examine the impact of stock price informativeness on a firm’s 
managerial decisions and operating performance. In the second part, I study the structural 
changes in CEO compensation around the spinoff and examine how compensation structure 
relates to the association between stock price informativeness and operating performance 
established in the first part. 
    The finance literature suggests that the information contents of stock price impact the real 
sector through the channel of managerial decisions. The stock price provides information 
feedback to the managers, leading to better management decisions.1 Understanding how 
much the markets know about their firm, the managers have reasonable expectation about 
their firm’s stock price movements. Therefore, when they observe unexpected trading 
activities, the managers can deduce the information contents. Alternatively, the stock price 
allows for an incentive contract subject to the market monitoring. Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1993, p.678) state that “the stock price incorporates performance information that cannot be 
                                                 
1 Boot and Thakor (1997), in comparing the role of the financial markets and that of a bank, argue that financial 
markets have information feedback, which affect the real decisions. Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), while 
examining the choice between private and public financing, suggest that the benefit of going public is a more 
informative stock price, which can lead to better management decisions. Habib, Johnsen, and Naik (1997) and 
Chang and Yu (2004) propose that corporate spinoffs facilitate more informative stock price, which helps 
managers improve their investment decisions. 
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extracted from the firm's current or future profit data. The additional information is useful for 
structuring managerial incentives.”  
I empirically investigate this proposed connection between informativeness of stock price 
and the real sector. Specifically, I measure the change in stock price informativeness over 
time and examine how it relates to the firm’s managerial decisions and subsequent 
performance (the construction of informativeness measures is described in the next chapter.) 
The stock price informativeness of a firm does not vary considerably over time.2 Therefore, 
my goal is to find a corporate event that drastically changes informativeness of stock prices. 
Corporate spinoffs provide a natural experiment for this study because the changes in 
informativeness around the spinoff are well supported theoretically and empirically.3 Chang 
and Yu (2004) and Goldman (2005) theoretically demonstrate that firms that choose to spin 
off meet with an increase in information production. Huson and MacKinnon (2003) report 
significantly more intensive informed trading and higher transaction costs after spinoffs.  
Using a sample of corporate spinoffs, I first test the hypothesis that changes in 
informativeness around the spinoffs are positively associated with subsequent changes in the 
operating performance of parent firms. The regressions analysis provides support for the 
hypothesis. The results indicate that mean change in informativeness is positive and 
significant, and is associated with an increase of 0.73 to 1.65% in industry-adjusted operating 
performance. For a firm with an average industry-adjusted operating performance, this means 
                                                 
2 I estimated a measure of stock price informativeness for entire CRSP firms from 1991 to 1999 using daily 
stock prices. The year-to-year changes in informativeness were roughly one tenth of the changes around the 
spinoff in magnitude, excluding year 1998 when it had a spike. 
 
3 One might argue that the top 5% of all firms in the U.S. stock market in terms of changes in informativeness 
would provide data with same characteristics as spinoffs. However, the changes in informativeness of those 
firms are likely to have been caused by some unique events such as spinoffs, carve-outs, or takeovers, as typical 
firms do not demonstrate significant changes in informativeness. Choosing one specific type of an event allows 
applying proper robust checks than dealing with the set of firms associated with different corporate events. 
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an increase in the industry-adjusted performance from 3.78% in the first year following the 
spinoff to 4.51 to 5.43% in the second or the third year.  
Next, I examine the managerial channel through which the informative stock price impacts 
firm performance. In particular, I examine whether the additional information in the stock 
price facilitates more efficient investment decisions. According to the Q theory, firms should 
invest more (less) as investment opportunities increase (decrease). In other words, investment 
efficiency is evaluated by assessing the alignment between a firm’s investment opportunity 
and its level of actual investment. I consider a firm over-investing (under-investing) if it 
invests more (less) than its industry when it has less (more) investment opportunities relative 
to its industry. I find that, among the firms suffering from an overinvestment or 
underinvestment problem prior to the spinoff, those firms with increased informativeness 
make significant adjustments to resolve investment inefficiency after the spinoff. This 
suggests that increased informed trading activities induce the managers to make better 
investment decisions, which appear to, at least partially, account for the improved operating 
performance.  
Spinoffs are not a random subsample of the population of firms. Therefore, I implement a 
number of robustness checks to address potential problems that can be caused by the 
characteristics of the data. On a general level, I adopt the Heckman’s two-stage estimation 
procedure (Heckman (1979)) for the test of sample selection bias. On a microscopic level, I 
examine specific alternative hypotheses that may explain the performance changes around 
the spinoff. The corporate focus hypothesis proposes that focus-improving firms achieve 
better operating performance after the spinoff by getting rid of unrelated divisions and 
concentrating on the division for which managerial skills and resources are well-suited. The 
 4
removal of poorly performing subsidiaries may explain the performance improvement of the 
parents subsequent to the spinoff, which I call the subsidiary performance hypothesis. The 
internal capital market hypothesis suggests that capital allocation is improved by dismantling 
internal capital markets via spinoffs. Collectively, the results indicates that the main findings 
still holds, accounting for the alternative explanations. 
The investigation so far has focused on the impact of stock price informativeness in the 
real sector. In the second part of the study, I extend the boundary of my investigation to 
include the structural change in CEO compensation around the spinoff. Major corporate 
restructuring often involves changes in managerial compensation structure, leaving CEO 
with a different incentive. Therefore, it is only natural to analyze whether potential change in 
compensation structure around the spinoff affects subsequent operating performance.  
Using the same sample of corporate spinoffs featured in the first part, I first test whether 
firms change CEOs’ compensation structure, more specifically the proportion of stock-based 
compensation, following spinoffs. I find that stock-based compensation increases 
significantly subsequent to spinoffs. This is an intuitive result for the following reasons. First, 
more informative stock price subsequent to spinoffs may encourage firms to further engage 
in stock-based compensation. Second, the post-spinoff stock price follows the division 
performance more closely, making stock-based compensation a more effective tool to align 
CEO’s incentives  
I further investigate whether stock-based compensation is an effective tool to structure 
managers’ incentive by examining the association between changes in stock-based 
compensation and changes in subsequent performance. I find that changes in the proportion 
of stock-based compensation are positively related to the changes in subsequent firm 
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performance. As a robustness check, I introduce alternative measures such as the proportion 
of CEO wealth tied to the stock performance to complement the measure of stock-based 
compensation. However, the additional measures do not demonstrate any significant 
association with the subsequent firm performance.  
Finally, I examine whether managers are more inclined to study the stock price and 
improve the performance when firms provide more stock-based compensation. One way to 
analyze this is to test a hypothesis that changes in informativeness around the spinoff and 
subsequent changes in performance have a stronger association when a greater proportion of 
CEO compensation is tied to stock performance. The results are not consistent with the 
hypothesis. The interaction term between informativeness and compensation is virtually 
insignificant. It appears that more performance-sensitive compensation helps induce CEOs to 
exert more effort, but the process does not necessary involve the channel of the stock prices.  
This paper is among the first studies on the role of information in the real sector. Related 
papers include Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) and Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2005). 
Durnev, Morck, and Yeung find a positive association between investment efficiency and 
stock price informativeness. However, their study differs from this paper in that their 
objective is to evaluate firm-specific return variation as an informativeness measure. In 
contrast, Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang share the goals of the present study, but they focus on 
investment sensitivity to stock price, whereas I start by examining operating performance and 
consider investment decisions as one of the managerial decisions contributing operating 
performance. Unlike the two papers, which examine the level of informativeness of a firm, 
my paper explicitly measures the changes in informativeness over time and analyzes its 
impact. This approach allows for a comparison of the operating performance of the same 
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firm at two different levels of informativeness. Consequently, if firms with a higher level of 
informed trading were different in some ways from those with a lower level of informed 
trading, this approach would still produce unbiased results. The difference in methodology 
leads to the difference in data. While the two papers use all firms available on CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT, I utilize a sample of corporate spinoffs and take an event-study approach. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the measures of 
informativeness, operating performance, and compensation structure. Section 3 describes the 
data and reports summary statistics. Section 4 investigates how stock price informativeness 
relates to the firm’s managerial investment decisions and operating performance. Section 5 
studies the structural change in CEO compensation and analyzes its impact on firm 
performance. Section 6 concludes. 
CHAPTER II 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
2.1  Measures of stock price informativeness 
In order to evaluate the impact of stock price informativeness, I first need to construct the 
measures of informativeness. Three informativeness measures are employed to gauge the 
changes in informativeness of stock price of a firm around the spinoff. First, two firm-
specific return variation measures are calculated using daily stock prices: return variation 
unexplained by market return, which I call firm-specific return variation (MM), and return 
variation unexplained by market return and industry return, which I call firm-specific return 
variation (MI). These measures are obtained by regressing firm returns on market return (and 
industry return) and calculating the standard deviation of the regression residuals, where both 
market return and industry return are value-weighted. Industry is defined as all firms 
(excluding the sample firm) that have the same 3-digit SIC code as the sample firm.  
These measures are based on a relatively recent stream of studies, which suggest that 
higher firm-specific return variation indicates increased private information in stock prices. 
Roll (1988, p. 566) first proposes that the return variation unexplained by market return and 
industry return seems to imply “the existence of either private information or else occasional 
frenzy unrelated to concrete information.” He adds that publicly available information events 
do not explain this unsystematic return variation. Following up on Roll (1988), Durnev et al. 
(2003, p.798) state that “the relative importance of the two preceding views is an empirical 
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question.” They show that firms with higher firm-specific return variation exhibit a stronger 
association between current returns and future earnings, which they conclude supports Roll’s 
former interpretation that greater idiosyncratic variation implies more private information. 
Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) report greater firm-specific return variation in countries with 
better investor protection and suggest that strong property rights promote informed arbitrage, 
leading to the impounding of more firm-specific information. In addition, Durnev, Morck, 
and Yeung (2004) document that U.S. industries and firms exhibiting larger firm-specific 
return variation make more value-enhancing capital budgeting decisions. In the spinoff 
literature, Huson and MacKinnon (2003) use the return variation unexplained by market 
return to estimate the changes in informativeness around the spinoff. Their findings using the 
return variation measure are consistent with those using the measures based on intraday 
transactions data.  
The last measure of informativeness is the relative effective bid-ask spread (REBA). The 
REBA is calculated as two times the absolute difference between the transaction price and 
the midpoint of the quoted bid and ask outstanding at the time of the trade, divided by the 
quote midpoint. To calculate the REBA, trades and quotes data from 1993 to 2001 are 
obtained from the NYSE Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database. In addition, trades and quotes 
data covering the NYSE and AMEX between 1983 and 1992 are obtained from the Institute 
for the Study of Security Markets (ISSM). The REBA is expected to be higher when there is 
more private information in the markets. It is a well established informativeness measure in 
the market microstructure literature. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) propose that a bid-ask 
spread is a function of the informational differences between insiders and the rest of the 
markets. A number of empirical studies utilize the bid-ask spread as an informativeness 
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measure. For example, Venkatesh and Chiang (1986), in measuring information asymmetry 
prior to earnings and dividend announcements, use the bid-ask spread as a proxy for 
information asymmetry. Howe and Lin (1992) study the relationship between dividend yield 
and the level of information asymmetry, which they capture by the bid-ask spread. 
For all three informativeness measures, changes in informativeness capture the changes in 
the degree of informativeness from the pre-spinoff to the post-spinoff period. The pre-spinoff 
period is defined as the 250 trading days ending 50 days prior to the first public 
announcement of a spinoff. The post-spinoff period is defined as the 250 days beginning 50 
days after the date of a spinoff distribution. For estimation purposes, I exclude the period 
between the announcement date and the distribution date. As a robustness check, shorter time 
period is applied: 40 days prior to the spinoff announcement for the “pre-spinoff” period and 
60 days after the spinoff distribution for the “post-spinoff” period. The qualitative results are 
same as those with 250 days as the estimation period and not reported here. 
 
2.2  Measures of operating performance 
Following Desai and Jain (1999), I use industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) as the 
measure of operating performance. Industry-adjusted ROA is defined as ROA of a sample 
firm minus ROA of its matching firm. For each sample firm, I select one matching firm that 
has the same four-digit SIC code as the sample firm and is closest to it in size in the month of 
the spinoff distribution. Desai and Jain report performance improvement for focus-improving 
firms subsequent to the spinoff. By employing Desai and Jain’s performance measure and 
making my performance measure comparable to theirs, I can test whether the performance 
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changes associated with changes in informativeness are, in fact, attributed to focus 
improvement. 
Changes in operating performance are defined as ROA in the second or the third year 
minus ROA in the first year following the spinoff. Changes in informativeness around the 
spinoff are matched with changes in operating performance in the second or the third year 
relative to the first fiscal year after the spinoff. The detailed timeline is illustrated in figure 1. 
Performance changes in this period provide a cleaner measure than those contemporaneous to 
changes in informativeness for two reasons. First, operating performance is expected to 
exhibit a delayed response to managers’ decisions that reflect the additional information 
feedback from stock prices following the spinoff. Secondly, according to Desai and Jain, 
most of the improvement in performance attributable to corporate focus is realized by the 
first year after the spinoff. In that regard, measuring the performance staring after the spinoff 
allows a less noisy link between changes in informativeness and changes in performance.   
 
2.3  Measures of compensation structure 
In this subsection, two measures of compensation structure are developed for the tests in 
the second part. First, stock-based compensation (SBC hereafter) is defined as the ratio of the 
sum of restricted stock grants and option grants to total compensation.4 SBC directly 
compensates CEOs for strong stock performance of the firm. Therefore it is an effective tool 
to induce CEOs to study information contents of stock prices if more informative stock prices 
can help managers with their managerial decisions. Pre-spinoff (post-spinoff) SBC is the 
                                                 
4 Total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, restricted stock grant, option grant, long-term incentive 
payouts, and all other payments. 
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average of year -4 through year 0 (year +1 through year +3). Change in SBC is post-spinoff 
SBC minus pre-spinoff SBC.  
While stock-based compensation is the direct measure of CEO incentive linked to the 
firm’s stock performance, sometimes alternative compensation schemes, though indirect, are 
implemented. Some firms reward CEO for his performance with bonus or by increasing 
future salary permanently. Garvey and Swan (2002) report that accounting-based bonus 
incentives are employed more by illiquid firms as a substitute to stock-based compensation. 
Therefore, I adopt Jensen and Murphy (1990)’s methodology and calculate pay-performance 
sensitivity (delta, hereafter) to measure how responsive CEO’s total compensation is to 
change in stock performance. Delta is defined as the estimated value of b, the coefficient of 
the following regression: 
 
∆ (CEO total compensation)t = a + b·∆ (shareholder wealth)t. 
 
The change in shareholder wealth variable is defined as 1−⋅ tt Vr , where tr  is the inflation-
adjusted rate of return on common stock realized in fiscal year t, and 1−tV  is the firm value at 
the end of the previous year. Delta reflects how responsive CEO’s total compensation is to 
the changes in the stock performance of the firm. Pre-spinoff (post-spinoff) delta is 
calculated by estimating the above equation using observations between year -4 and 0 (year 
+1 and year +3). The change in delta around the spinoff is post-spinoff delta minus pre-
spinoff delta. 
CHAPTER III 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
3.1  Spinoff data 
The spinoff sample in this study covers the firms that completed spinoffs between 1975 
and 2001. The sample ends in 2001 because the tests require operating performance data for 
three years after spinoff distributions. The data used in Desai and Jain (1999) covering 155 
spinoffs between 1975 and 1991 are used in this study.5 Data from 1992 to 2001 are gathered 
from two sources: the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes, which assign 
distribution codes of 3762, 3763, and 3764 to spinoff firms and Security Data Company 
(SDC), which identifies spinoff cases based on news articles.6 I then use news articles in 
Factiva to verify the spinoffs and identify their announcement dates and effective dates of 
distribution. This step yields a sample of 379 spinoffs between 1992 and 2001.  
To remain in my sample, a spinoff has to satisfy the following criteria7: (1) CRSP data for 
the parent firm are available for one year before the spinoff announcement and after the 
spinoff distribution; (2) COMPUSTAT data for the parent are available for at least two years 
after the spinoff; (3) the subsidiary starts trading publicly after the spinoff announcement is 
                                                 
5 I am extremely grateful to Hemang Desai for making his data available to me. See Desai and Jain (1999) for 
details regarding their data selection criteria. 
 
6 Distribution code 3763 refers to nontaxable spinoffs. Code 3762 refers to spinoffs taxable at the same rate as 
dividends, and 3764 refers to spinoffs taxable at the same rate as capital gains. 
 
7 The data selection criteria include the criteria applied by Desai and Jain to ensure the consistency between the 
later-period sample (1992-2001) and the sample used in Desai and Jain (1975-1991).   
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made; (4) the parent’s SIC code is not between 6000 and 6500; (5) the parent is not 
simultaneously engaged in mergers or acquisitions; (6) the spinoff is a nontaxable transaction; 
and, (7) real estate investment trusts (REITs) and tracking stocks are excluded from the 
sample. 
Based on these criteria, I drop 85 spinoffs from the sample because the parent firm does 
not have CRSP data for the required time period and 108 spinoffs because COMPUSTAT 
data are not available for the required period. Fifteen spinoffs are excluded in which 
subsidiaries start trading publicly before the spinoff announcements are made; for such firms, 
some of the informational benefit of spinoffs may be realized before the spinoffs are 
undertaken. Thus, they should be treated differently from the rest of the spinoffs. Nineteen 
spinoffs with SIC codes between 6000 and 6500 are removed. Also, six parents engaged in 
mergers or acquisitions simultaneously are eliminated. Mergers and acquisitions have an 
opposite effect to that of spinoffs in terms of stock price informativeness; thus, any impact of 
a spinoff on informed trading might be offset by that of a merger or an acquisition. I consult 
the Commerce Clearing House’s Capital Changes Reporter to determine the tax status of the 
spinoffs and eliminate 27 taxable spinoffs. One REIT and 5 tracking stocks are excluded. The 
final sample consists of 268 parents and 287 subsidiaries.  
 
3.2  CEO Compensation Data 
CEO compensation data are collected for the firms in the spinoff data featured in the first 
essay. For each firm, the compensation data are collected from year -4 to year +3, where year 
0 is the year of spinoff distribution. The data include total 219 firms, spanning 7.2 years per 
firm on average. The data between 1992 and 2001 are acquired from ExecuComp. The data 
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prior to 1992 are obtained from the firms’ annual proxy statements. The record of the 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing goes back to as early as 1978. In 1992 the 
SEC began requiring that firms must disclose detailed information on executive 
compensation in their proxy statements including salary, bonus, stock options, restricted 
stock, and long-term incentive payouts.  Without such requirement, pre-1992 proxy 
statements typically disclose only option grants in addition to the total compensation. 
Estimated values of restricted stock grants are included in total compensation.  
 
3.3  Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports the distribution of spinoffs by effective date of distribution and three 
summary statistics for parent firms. Market value of a parent is measured at the end of the 
month of the spinoff distribution. Spinoffs are distributed without humps over the sample 
period although the frequency of spinoffs is in an increasing trend over time. The sample 
firms are spread across industries, covering 47 2-digit SIC codes (not reported). The mean 
(median) market value of parent firms is $4,222.07 million ($580.31 million). The mean 
(median) value of total assets of parent firms is $5,177.72 million ($840.70 million).8 Total 
assets are the value at the end of first fiscal year after the spinoff distribution. Parent firms 
constitute 76% (median) of the combined firms in terms of total assets in the first fiscal year 
after the spinoff. 
Panel A of table 2 tabulates changes in stock price informativeness around the spinoff for 
the three informativeness measures: firm-specific return variation (MM), firm-specific return 
variation (MI), and REBA. All three measures indicate that parent firms’ prices become 
significantly more informative after the spinoff, consistent with Huson and MacKinnon 
                                                 
8 Market value and total assets are reported in 1995 dollars. 
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(2003). The mean (median) change from the pre-spinoff to the post-spinoff period for the 
firm-specific return variation (MM) measure is 0.0036 (0.0026), which represents an increase 
of roughly 15% (12%) over the pre-spinoff period and is significantly different from zero at 
the 1% level. Similarly, the firm-specific return variation (MI) measure increases by 15% 
(12%). This is not surprising considering that the correlation coefficient between the two 
measures is .997 (table 2, panel B). The REBA, as the measure based on intraday 
transactions data, displays a similar pattern, but with a different magnitude. The REBA has 
25% and 26% correlation with the two firm-specific return variation measures, respectively, 
both of which are significant at the 1% level. The mean (median) change in the REBA 
around the spinoff is 0.0042 (0.0010), which represents approximately a 32% (14%) increase 
from the pre-spinoff to the post-spinoff period and is significantly different from zero at the 
1% level. These increased trading costs measured by the relative effective bid-ask spread 
indicate that there is more informed trading following the spinoff. One implicit assumption 
made here as well as in Huson and MacKinnon is that pre-spinoff combined-firm stock prices 
are a good proxy for information production on the parent firm. As the parent constitutes 
about 76% of the combined firm, information production prior to the spinoff is likely to be 
concentrated on the parent firm, leading to the impounding of more private information 
regarding the parent in stock prices. 
In panel C of table 2, I report raw ROA and industry-adjusted ROA of parent firms from 
year +1 to year +3, where year 0 is defined as the year of a spinoff distribution. Raw ROA 
does not vary considerably over time. The mean (median) raw ROA in years +1, +2, and +3 
are 0.1297 (0.1321), 0.1326 (0.1362), and 0.1238 (0.1243), respectively. Sample firms 
outperform their matching firms throughout the testing period of the three years. The mean 
 16
(median) industry-adjusted ROA in years +1, +2, and +3 are 0.03781 (0.0150), 0.0551 
(0.0211), and 0.0592 (0.0187), respectively, all of which are significantly different from zero 
at the 1% level. The results indicate that raw ROA increases (decreases) by 0.0029 (−0.0059) 
in the second (third) year relative to the first year while industry-adjusted ROA increases 
0.0173 (0.0214) in the second (third) year. Evidently, changes in industry-adjusted ROA are 
more pronounced than changes in raw ROA, consistent with Desai and Jain. It also suggests 
that industry-adjusted ROA controls for the fluctuations caused by different industry 
characteristics. 
Table 3 tabulates CEO compensation and stock holdings. The results are also depicted in 
figure 3. Figure 3A shows the median trend of total compensation and stock-based 
compensation by year (all compensation measures are converted to 1995 dollar value). 
Stock-based compensation is defined as the sum of restricted stock grants and option grants. 
Both total compensation and stock-based compensation increase over time.  Compensation 
data demonstrate a strong right skewness. Therefore, the analysis throughout the paper 
concentrates on the median values, unless specified otherwise. The median total 
compensation (stock-based compensation) is as low as $188,150 ($0) in 1977 and reaches its 
peak of $5,076,680 ($2,819,900) in 2000. Overall, stock-based compensation increases in 
proportion to total compensation. 
Figure 3B shows percentage of firms utilizing stock-based compensation and option grant 
per year. Increasing number of firms adopt stock-based compensation over time. While as 
little as 15% of the firms provide stock-based compensation in late 1970s, over 80% of the 
firms make stock-based payments in 2000s. Throughout the entire sample period, the 
majority of stock-based compensation is in the form of option grants rather than restricted 
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stock grant as shown in the figure 3B. During the post-1991 period, where all firms report 
restricted stock grants separately, only 24% of the firms use restricted stock grants on 
average, whereas 76% of the firms use stock grant. The frequency of usage of option and 
stock grant is consistent with previous findings.9 Figure 3C indicates that the stock-based 
compensation is concentrated on option grants in terms of dollar amounts as well: only 4% 
(6%) of total compensation constitutes restricted stock grants whereas 25% (36%) of the total 
compensation comprises option grants for the entire sample period (the post-1991 period). 
One possible reason why firms prefer granting options to granting restricted stocks may be 
that, unlike stock options whose payoffs function is convex in stock price, restricted stock 
creates a linear payoff schedule because of the zero exercise price.10 Thus, risk-averse CEOs 
who receive restricted stock bear the potential wealth loss from risky investment projects. 
Therefore, higher restricted stock grants are likely to induce CEOs to forego value-increasing 
risky projects. 
Table 4 reports summary statistics for the measures of CEO compensation structure. Mean 
(median) pre-spinoff SBC is approximately 26% (24%) and mean (median) post-spinoff SBC 
is roughly 30% (28%). SBC increases by mean (median) of 4.3% (1.3%) around the spinoff, 
which is significant at the 1% level. Two possible explanations are following. First, more 
informative stock price subsequent to spinoff encourages firms to increase stock-based 
compensation. Tirole and Holmstrom (1992) propose that additional information in the stock 
price is useful in structuring CEO incentives, which is empirically supported by Garvey and 
                                                 
9 Murphy (1999) reports that 62.7% of his sample firms granted options in 1992. Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien 
(2000) report that the percentage of firms granting stock options range between 53.92 and 71.85 during the five 
year period between 1992 and 1997 while the percentage of firms granting restricted stock varies between 18.96 
and 21.17 during the same period. 
 
10 Ofek and Yermack (1997) propose that restricted stock grant can be viewed as an option with a zero strike 
price. 
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Swan (2002). Second, firms provide CEOs with more SBC following spinoffs as post-spinoff 
stock prices follow more closely the performance of the division of which CEOs are in 
charge. The change in firm size around the spinoff is not expected to affect the change in 
stock-based compensation at the significant level. Garvey and Swan document a correlation 
coefficient of 0.05 between stock-based pay and firm size (measured by total assets) using 
cross-sectional data. Considering that firm size, on average, decreases following spinoffs, the 
pure magnitude of an increase in stock-based compensation reported in this study is a rather 
conservative statement. 
Median pre-spinoff delta is 0.00001 and post-spinoff SBC is 0.00019. Due to the missing 
data, change in delta around the spinoff is -0.00001, a negative value, which means that CEO 
compensation became less sensitive to the firm’s stock performance by 1 cent per each $1000 
change. The change is small and statistically insignificant. Unlike Jensen and Murphy (1990), 
where one value of delta fitting all firms in the sample is estimated, my study requires an 
individual delta for each firm, which results in a small sample size for estimation. For each 
firm, the number of observation available for regression ranges between 2 and 4. Therefore, I 
should point out that delta is relatively less reliable measure among the four measures. 
CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS – PART I 
 
Empirical results for the first part of the study are detailed in this chapter. I first test the 
association between stock price informativeness and operating performance. Then, I examine 
whether managerial investment decisions serves as a channel linking informativeness and 
performance. Finally, I implement a number of robustness checks to address potential 
problems caused by the characteristics of the data.  
 
4.1 Price informativeness and operating performance 
In this section, I test the hypothesis that changes in stock price informativeness around the 
spinoff are positively related to subsequent changes in operating performance of the parents. 
I estimate the following equation:  
 
iiii XInfotROA εβββ +⋅++−Δ⋅+=+Δ 210 )1,1(),1( , 
 
where ),1( tROAi +Δ  is the proxy for changes in operating performance of parent firms and is 
obtained by measuring industry-adjusted changes in return on assets from the first fiscal year 
after the spinoff to the second year ( t  = 2) or the third year ( t  = 3). )1,1( +−Δ iInfo  is the 
change in informativeness of stock prices of parent firms from the pre-spinoff to the post-
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spinoff period. Informativeness is measured by each of the three informativeness measures 
described in section II. For all regressions, the main variables, informativeness and operating 
performance, are trimmed at the 1 % level to prevent outliers from influencing the results. 
iX  is a set of control variables. For all regressions, I control for the pre-spinoff level of 
informativeness, changes in beta, changes in leverage, size, and 3-day excess return around 
spinoff announcements. In addition, changes in systematic stock return variations as well as 
the pre-spinoff systematic return variations are used as control variables when the firm-
specific return variation measures are utilized as the informativeness measure. The 
construction of the control variables is detailed in the Appendix. Changes in beta and 
changes in leverage measure changes from year –1 to year +1, comparable to changes in 
information measures. For the hypothesis to hold, 1β  must be greater than zero.  
The regressions in table 5 yield a univariate analysis using each of the three 
informativeness measures. The first three regressions use changes in industry-adjusted ROA 
from year +1 to +2 as the dependent variable. All three regressions show the significant and 
positive relationship between changes in informativeness around the spinoff and subsequent 
changes in operating performance, consistent with the hypothesis. The coefficients of the 
three informativeness measures range between 2.00 and 2.56, indicating that mean level of 
change in informativeness is associated with an increase of 0.84 to 0.92% in industry-
adjusted operating performance. For a firm with the mean level of industry-adjusted 
operating performance, this means an increase in the industry-adjusted performance from 
3.78% in the first year following the spinoff to 4.62 to 4.7% in the second year.  
The next three regressions use changes in industry-adjusted ROA from year +1 to +3 as 
the dependent variable. The coefficients of the informativeness measures remain positive and 
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significant. The magnitude of the two firm-specific return measures is stronger, while that of 
the REBA is slightly weaker than in the first three regressions. For all three informativeness 
measures, the statistical significance is higher than in the first three regressions, with two 
measures significant at the 5% level. It suggests that the informativeness measures are more 
predictive of long-run performance. This informativeness-performance association is well 
depicted in Figure 2. Sample firms are sorted into four quartiles based on the magnitude of 
changes in informativeness around the spinoff, with quartile 1 corresponding to the firms 
experiencing the least improvement in informativeness. Firms in quartile 1 display the least 
improvement in operating performance, whereas those in quartile 4 demonstrate the most 
improvement. 
The results of multivariate regressions (table 6) are consistent with those of the univariate 
analysis. For all three informativeness measures, statistical significance is improved after 
control variables are introduced. The informativeness variables are significant at the 5% level 
for all six regressions. The coefficients of the two firm-specific return variation measures are 
3.8634 and 4.7583, much higher than those in the univariate regressions. This indicates that 
mean level of change in informativeness is associated with an increase of 0.73 to 1.65% in 
industry-adjusted operating performance. For a firm with the mean level of industry-adjusted 
operating performance, this means an increase in the industry-adjusted performance from 
3.78% in the first year following the spinoff to 4.51 to 5.43% in the second or the third year. 
None of the control variables are consistently significant throughout the six regressions. 
The coefficient on the changes in systematic variation variable is negative throughout all four 
regressions using the firm-specific return variations as informativeness measures and 
statistically significant in regression 2. This can be interpreted to suggest that more informed 
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trading activities after the spinoff seem to transmit more private information regarding the 
industry and overall markets, decreasing the systematic portion of the return variation. The 
pre-spinoff level of unsystematic and systematic variations does not explain the changes in 
performance at a significant level. Changes in beta are positively related to changes in 
performance throughout all six regressions. Especially, they are statistically significant at the 
5% level when the REBA is used as the informativeness measure (regressions 3 and 6). Beta 
represents the sensitivity of a firm to macroeconomic changes. Those firms that become more 
sensitive to macroeconomic factors seem to improve the performance more. According to 
Chang and Yu (2005), more volatile firms benefit more from information production in the 
market. The changes in leverage and size variables are largely insignificant throughout all 
regressions. The coefficients of 3-day excess return around the spinoff announcement are 
insignificantly different from zero except in regression 6. Overall, the excess return variable 
appears to explain the performance changes in the third year relative to the first year better 
than the changes in the second year, suggesting that markets have some predictive power 
regarding the long-term firm performance at the time of spinoff announcements.  
It should be noted that subsidiary firms are not testable given the design of the tests. The 
informativeness measure for subsidiaries cannot be constructed since their stock prices do not 
exist prior to the spinoff. Alternatively, pre-spinoff combined-firm measures can be 
compared with a value-weighted combination of post-spinoff parent and subsidiary measures. 
However, this test is far from being accurate, as it implicitly assumes that informativeness is 
a linear function.  
One can consider, for the purpose of the tests, a sample involving different corporate 
events such as carve-outs and tracking stocks. It should be noted, however, that a carve-out 
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generates cash inflows to the parent firm, a profit from the sale of its subsidiary IPO. The 
cash inflows can be used to finance new projects, thus changing investments and profitability 
of the parent temporarily. Therefore, it is crucial to disentangle the effect of the cash infusion 
on operating performance from the effect of changes in informativeness. Tracking stocks, on 
the other hand, affect the information environment of a firm without altering its 
organizational structure, providing a more attractive sample for the tests.11 A drawback of 
using tracking stocks is the small sample size. Previous studies on tracking stocks report only 
dozens of observations in the U.S. markets since the introduction of tracking stock.12  
 
4.2  Price informativeness and investment decisions 
The evidence so far supports the view that changes in informativeness of the stock price 
are positively associated with changes in subsequent operating performance. Naturally, the 
next question is how price informativeness affects performance. In this section, I investigate 
whether managerial decisions serve as a channel through which informativeness contribute to 
performance. In particular, I examine whether increased informativeness of stock price 
facilitates more efficient investment decisions. To evaluate managerial investment decisions, 
I rely on Q theory, which suggests that firms should invest more (less) as their investment 
opportunities increase (decrease). In other words, investment efficiency is evaluated in terms 
of the alignment between a firm’s investment opportunity and its level of actual investment. 
If the stock price provides information feedback on managerial investment decisions, those 
                                                 
11 Tracking stocks are launched to track the performance of a division of interest in a multidivisional firm, and 
holders of these stocks have limited voting rights and no claim on assets. 
 
12 Billett and Mauer (1998) identify 20 tracking stock transactions from 1980 through the first quarter of 1997. 
Similarly, Zuta (1997) uses a sample of 20 tracking stock transactions.  
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firms with increased informative following the spinoff should align their investment with 
their investment opportunity better after the spinoff.  
Matching firms’ investments and investment opportunities are used as benchmarks to 
evaluate investment efficiency of sample firms. Sample firms are sorted into four subgroups 
based on their pre-spinoff investments and investment opportunities relative to those of their 
matching firms. Within each group, post-spinoff investments of information-increasing firms 
are compared with those of information-decreasing firms. Changes in informativeness are 
captured by changes in the firm-specific return variation (MM). Industry-adjusted investment 
is a sample firm’s investment minus that of its matching firm. Tobin’s average Q is used as a 
proxy for investment opportunities. Pre-spinoff Q and investments are averaged over the two 
years prior to the spinoff and post-spinoff values are averaged over the two years following 
the spinoff.13 (See the Appendix for more detailed description of the variables.) 
The full sample results (table 7) show that changes in industry-adjusted investment around 
the spinoff are overall insignificant. It appears that parent firms, on average, do not alter their 
investment behavior considerably. More intriguing is the results for the subgroups. Table 6 
reports the pre-spinoff industry-adjusted investment, post-spinoff industry-adjusted 
investment, and changes in industry-adjusted investment around the spinoff for the following 
four subgroups: (1) Q > 0 and I > 0; (2) Q < 0 and I < 0; (3) Q > 0 and I < 0; and (4) Q < 0 
and I > 0. Q > 0 indicates that a sample firm’s investment opportunity is higher than that of 
its matching firm, and I > 0 indicates that a sample firm’s investment is higher than that of its 
matching firm. Group (1) comprises 48 firms that have both investment (I) and investment 
                                                 
13 Using capital expenditure averaged over two-year period appears to be preferable to using a one-year value, 
as it reduces influences of lumpy capital expenditures specific to some year. Thus, I report the results based on 
two-year averages here. However, I also perform the same tests using one-year values. I construct pre-spinoff Q 
and investment using year –1 values and post-spinoff Q and investment using year +1 values. The results are 
qualitatively the same as those using two-year-average measures and are not reported here. 
 25
opportunities (Q) higher than their matching firms prior to the spinoff. Q theory suggests that 
they should continue to invest more than their matching firms to avoid inefficient investment. 
However, both information-increasing firms and information-decreasing firms cut down on 
their investment. The magnitude of reduction is much stronger with information-decreasing 
firms. Median change in investment for the information-increasing firms is –0.0140 whereas 
median change for the information-decreasing firms is –0.0252. Group (2) includes 73 firms 
that have both Q and I lower than those of their matching firms prior to the spinoff. 
Subsequent to the spinoff, both information-increasing firms and information-decreasing 
firms maintain their investment level lower than that of their matching firms, meeting the 
criteria for investment efficiency. The firms in Groups (3) and (4) demonstrate inefficient 
asset allocation before the spinoff. Group (3) comprises 47 firms that underinvest prior to the 
spinoff. Those firms with increased informativeness following the spinoff respond to their 
problem by investing significantly more relative to their matching firms after the spinoff, as 
Q theory suggests. On the other hand, those firms with decreased informativeness increase 
their investment by only an insignificant amount. The median change in investment for 
information-increasing firms is 0.0150 and the median change for information-decreasing 
firms is 0.0017. Group (4) shows similar results for the 55 firms that overinvest prior to the 
spinoff. In this group, information-increasing firms cut down on their investment heavily, 
ameliorating their overinvestment problem. By contrast, information-decreasing firms do not 
change their investment behavior significantly after the spinoff. The median change in 
investment for information-increasing firms is –0.0093, which is significant at the 1% level, 
while the median change for information-decreasing firms is 0.0004, which is statistically 
insignificant. Information-increasing firms exhibit more improvement not only in the 
 26
statistical sense but also in terms of the economic magnitude. Overall, those firms with 
increased informativeness following the spinoff appear to make better adjustments to resolve 
inefficient investment problem after the spinoff, suggesting that investment decisions are one 
of the channels through which informative stock price can induce managers to improve 
operating performance. 
As a caveat, it should be noted that even if we could not find any evidence relating 
informativeness to investment decisions, we should not dismiss the role of information in the 
real sector. Informativeness may affect operating performance through different routes that 
are not captured by the investment measures. Furthermore, my tests address only the 
quantitative aspect of investment decisions. The qualitative aspect of the decisions is not 
considered in this study.  
 
4.3  Robustness checks 
In this section, I implement a number of robustness checks to address potential problems 
that can be caused by the characteristics of the data. On a general level, I adopt the 
Heckman’s two-stage estimation procedure (Heckman (1979)) for the test of sample 
selection bias. On a microscopic level, I examine three specific alternative hypotheses that 
may explain the performance changes around the spinoff.  
 
4.3.1  Test of sample selection bias 
One might argue that using a sample of spinoffs can cause self-selection bias as corporate 
spinoffs are not a random sub-sample of the population of firms. Some unobserved factor 
that drives firms to opt for spinoffs might be also correlated with both informativeness of 
 27
trading and operating performance. Therefore, I investigate whether the association between 
informed trading and operating performance is robust to the tests of sample selection bias. 
Heckman’s two-stage estimation procedure is designed to control for the characteristics that 
cause selection bias (Heckman (1979)). The hypothesis is that the set of firms that choose to 
spin off does not represent a random sample of firms. The first-stage PROBIT estimation 
identifies firm characteristics correlated with the spinoff decision. For the PROBIT 
estimation, I pool the sample firms and their matching firms and estimate the following 
equation.  
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where iF  is a set of firm characteristics that may affect the decision to spin off.    1=iD if a 
firm chooses to spin off and 0 otherwise. *iD  is an unobservable variable. If 0
* >iD , a firm 
decides to spin off.  The variables employed in the first-stage estimation are Tobin’s average 
Q, investment level, year –1 ROA, year –2 ROA, year –3 ROA, standard deviation of three 
ROAs, the number of segments in a firm, pre-spinoff level of systematic and unsystematic 
stock return variation, leverage, and size. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of total assets 
divided by book value of total assets, where market value of total assets is book value of total 
assets plus market value of common equity minus book value of common equity minus 
deferred taxes. Investment level is capital expenditure divided by sales.14 The likelihood of a 
                                                 
14 Capital expenditure divided by total assets is also used as a measure of investment. Test results are similar to 
those using capital expenditure divided by sales and are not reported here. 
 28
spinoff is captured by a variable called Lambda, which is, in turn, introduced as the 
correction term for self-selection in the second-stage OLS estimation as follows:  
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where φ and Φ  are the density and distribution function for a standard normal variable, 
respectively, and 
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If any of the firm characteristics variables described above is attributable to the spinoff 
decision and is correlated with informativeness and operating performance then 3β  must be 
significant. Furthermore, if the established relationship between informed trading and firm 
performance were, in fact, driven by the firm characteristics, the inclusion of i
∧λ  would 
reduce the statistical significance of 1β .  
In table 8, I report the two-stage estimation results. Several firm-characteristics variables 
are predictive of the spinoff decision. ROAs in year -3 and year -2 are significantly lower for 
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sample firms, indicating that firms that perform worse are more likely to spin off. This is 
consistent with the prediction of Chang and Yu (2004) that firms with lower ROAs and 
higher standard deviations of ROAs are more likely to spin off. Chang and Yu suggest that as 
a firm matures and more competitors enter into its business, driving down the profit and 
increasing risks, it tends to become focused, since additional information is more valuable 
when the firm faces low profit and high volatility. Firm-specific variation is significantly 
lower for the sample firms, implying that their stock prices prior to the spinoff are not as 
informative as those of matching firms. Less informative stock prices may provide an 
incentive for a firm to spin off in order to achieve more informed trading. The number of 
segments is significantly higher for sample firms. This can be interpreted in two ways. First, 
the level of informativeness may be captured by the number of segments. It is harder to 
interpret the signals contained in the stock price of multi-segment firms than those of single-
segment firms, since the signals for all segments of a firm are pooled into a single stock price. 
Accordingly, reducing the number of segments via a spinoff would help managers 
understand the signals sent by informed traders. Another explanation is based on the 
assumption that there exists an optimal number of segments for a firm in an industry. If a 
firm has more segments than the optimal level, it may undertake a spinoff to become leaner. 
Both explanations predict a positive relation between the number-of-segments variable and 
the likelihood of a spinoff, consistent with the results. Tobin’s Q is higher for sample firms, 
although not significant. This is consistent with the findings documented in the 
diversification literature. Lang and Stulz (1994), Hyland (1997), and Villalonga (2004) find 
that firms that diversify tend to be in low Q industries. Having little growth prospect in their 
own businesses, the firms are looking to take over other firms with greater investment 
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opportunities. Conversely, firms with high Tobin’s Q may be looking to spin off so that they 
can improve focus on the business with greater investment opportunities.  
Panel B of Table 8 tabulates the results of the second-stage OLS regressions. Regressions 
1 and 3 use the firm-specific return variation (MM) as the informativeness measure and 
regressions 2 and 4 utilize the REBA as the informativeness measure.15 Lambda, 
representing the likelihood of a spinoff, has different signs in the two regressions where 
Lambda is significant. It appears that the firm characteristics, while differentiating sample 
firms from their matching firms, have only a minimal effect on the association between 
performance and informativeness. The effect of informativeness becomes, in fact, stronger in 
three of the four regressions once firm characteristics correlated with the spinoff decision are 
taken into account. In particular, the coefficient of changes in firm-specific return variation is 
higher by 25% (15%) in the second (third) year after the spinoff than in the previous OLS 
regressions and is significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, excess return around spinoff 
announcements becomes highly significant, indicating that announcement-period market 
reactions are predictive of the subsequent operating performance. The fact that both changes 
in informativeness and excess return are significant implies that the two are complementary 
measures, capturing different aspects of informed trading. The rest of the control variables 
display similar patterns to those in the previous regressions. In sum, once the self-selection 
correction term is introduced, the association between price informativeness and operating 
performance is even stronger, providing additional support for the findings from the previous 
section.  
 
                                                 
15 The firm-specific return variation (MI) is excluded from the analysis from this point on as it is highly 
correlated with the firm-specific return variation (MM), resulting in similar results.  
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4.3.2  Corporate focus hypothesis 
I examine corporate focus hypothesis that focus-improving firms achieve better operating 
performance after spinoffs by getting rid of unrelated divisions and concentrating on the 
division for which managerial skills and resources are well-suited. A focus-improving spinoff 
refers to a cross-industry spinoff in which a parent firm improves its focus by spinning off an 
unrelated division. For empirical purposes, I categorize a spinoff as focus-improving if the 
parent and subsidiary have different two-digit SIC codes.16 Previous studies document that 
elimination of negative synergy between the divisions via divestitures such as asset sales and 
spinoffs is associated with an improvement in operating performance. John and Ofek (1995) 
find that asset sales lead to an improvement of operating performance relative to the year of 
asset sales for focus-improving sellers. Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997) and Desai 
and Jain (1999) report a significant improvement in post-spinoff industry-adjusted operating 
performance for the focus-improving parents.  
I first compare the changes in operating performance of focus-improving and non-focus-
improving spinoffs. Consistent with the previous studies, the results show (table 9, panel A) 
that focus-improving parents demonstrate a significant improvement in industry-adjusted 
operating performance relative to the first year after the spinoffs. The mean changes in 
performance from year +1 to +2 and year +1 to +3 are 0.0286 and 0.0318 and are significant 
at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. Non-focus-improving parents, on the contrary, do not 
exhibit significant changes in performance. The mean and median changes from year +1 to 
year +2 are barely above zero and mean and median changes from year +1 to +3 turn 
negative. Interestingly, the mean and median performance changes of focusing parents are 
                                                 
16 If a firm spins off more than one subsidiary, and one subsidiary has the same two-digit SIC code as the parent 
and the others do not, the firm is excluded from the categorization. 
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not significantly different from those of non-focusing parents, implying that the focus 
improvement may not explain the changes in operating performance. The comparison 
between information-increasing firms and information-decreasing firms appears to explain 
the change in operating performance better (table 9, panel B). For instance, the mean (median) 
difference in operating performance from year +1 to year +2 between information-increasing 
firms and information-decreasing firms is 0.0535 (0.0173), more than twice the difference 
between focus-improving firms and non-focus-improving firms.17  
The relative importance between the focus improvement and changes in informativeness is 
reassured in the regression results (table 9, panel C). The univariate analysis (regressions 1 
and 4) does not find any significant association between focus and performance changes, 
where focus is an indicator variable that equals 1 for focus-improving spinoffs and 0 for non-
focus-improving spinoffs. In regressions 2 and 5, I regress changes in operating performance 
on focus, changes in firm-specific return variation (MM), and a set of control variables. 
Whereas the focus variable is not significant, the changes in informativeness are positively 
and significantly related to performance change in the presence of corporate focus variable. 
Regressions 3 and 6 use changes in the REBA as an informativeness measure instead and 
find qualitatively same results as regressions 2 and 5. In conclusion, while focus-improving 
firms demonstrate some improvement in operating performance that non-focus-improving 
firms do not, the effect of the focus improvement is not statistically strong enough to explain 
the changes in operating performance, and the effect of informativeness on operating 
performance continues to prevail with the inclusion of corporate focus. 
 
                                                 
17 The firm-specific return variation (MM) is utilized as an information measure. Using the REBA as an 
informativeness measure produces qualitatively same results. 
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4.3.3  Subsidiary performance hypothesis 
I test whether the removal of poorly performing subsidiaries explains the subsequent 
performance improvement of the parents following the spinoff. I call this the subsidiary 
performance hypothesis. Evidently, some of the spinoffs are undertaken to eliminate poorly 
performing subsidiaries. For instance, American Express Co. unloaded several 
underperforming businesses by spinning off its subsidiary, Ameriprise Financial, Inc., in 
September, 2005, after which its share was expected to sell higher by 25% or more 
(BusinessWeek, 2005).  
Subsidiary financial data are obtained from COMPUSTAT. Pre-spinoff pro forma 
financial data are available for 157 subsidiaries. I focus on median values because mean 
values are driven by one extreme observation. Contrary to the prediction of the hypothesis, I 
find that the spun-off subsidiaries of the sample firms do not, on average, underperform their 
matching firms before or after the spinoff at the significant level (table 10, panel A). Median 
industry-adjusted performance of the subsidiaries is 0.0253, 0.0133, –0.0068, and –0.0061 in 
years –1, +1, +2, and +3, respectively. Although the performance turns negative in the 
second and the third years after the spinoff, none of the values is significantly different from 
zero. Moreover, the performance changes of the parents over the three-year post-spinoff 
testing period are not significantly correlated with the pre-spinoff performance of the 
subsidiaries nor with the performance changes of the subsidiaries over the testing period 
(table 10, panel B). These results indicate that the performance of the subsidiaries does not 
explain the subsequent performance changes of the parents. The regression analysis also 
suggests that the subsidiaries’ performance does not affect the association between 
informativeness and operating performance (not reported). 
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4.3.4.  Internal capital market hypothesis 
The internal capital market hypothesis proposes that capital allocation efficiency is 
improved by dismantling internal capital markets via spinoffs. After the spinoff, the parent is 
unable to ration or subsidize its spun-off subsidiary, which may improve or worsen its capital 
allocation efficiency. Previous studies provide evidence that spinoffs alter capital allocation. 
Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (2002) find that subsidiaries’ investment becomes more 
sensitive to their investment opportunities after the spinoff. Ahn and Denis (2004) examine 
the parents and subsidiaries at the segment level and conclude that investment efficiency of 
the segments is improved after the spinoff. Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) report that asset 
sales lead to an improvement in investment efficiency for the remaining divisions.  
The test results indicate that the firms that underinvested (overinvested) prior to the spinoff 
tend to increase (reduce) investment, consistent with the internal capital market hypothesis.18 
However, this improvement in investment efficiency is primarily found among the 
information-increasing firms even though spinoffs dismantle the internal capital markets of 
all sample firms (table 7). In other words, while the effect of dismantling internal capital 
market exists, increased stock price informativeness around the spinoff helps managers 
improve their capital allocation decisions even more.  
 
                                                 
18 In table 6, I report a comparison of the investment efficiency of information-increasing firms and that of 
information-decreasing firms. The investment efficiency of the combination of these two groups of firms is not 
reported in the table. 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS - PART II 
 
The investigation so far has focused on the impact of stock price informativeness in the 
real sector. In the second part of the study, I extend the boundary of my investigation to 
include the structural change in CEO compensation around the spinoff. Table 4 reports that 
firms increase stock-based compensation significantly following spinoffs (the results are 
discussed in section 3). Therefore, it is only natural to analyze whether this increase in stock-
based compensation affects subsequent firm performance.  
Using the same sample of corporate spinoffs featured in the first part, I investigate whether 
stock-based compensation is an effective tool to structure managers’ incentive by examining 
the association between changes in stock-based compensation and changes in subsequent 
performance. I also examine whether stock-based compensation helps induce managers to 
study the stock price as a way to improve the performance. One way to analyze this view is 
to test a hypothesis that changes in informativeness around the spinoff and subsequent 
changes in performance have a stronger association when a greater proportion of CEO 
compensation is tied to stock performance.  
 
5.1  CEO compensation structure and operating performance 
In this subsection, I test a hypothesis that changes in stock-based compensation are 
positively related to the changes in subsequent performance. First of all, I conduct a simple 
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univariate analysis. Firms are divided into two sub-groups depending on whether 
performance-sensitive compensation around the spinoff increases or not. The hypothesis 
implies that those firms providing greater proportion of performance-related compensation to 
CEOs following spinoffs are likely to have more improvement in subsequent operating 
performance. Panel A of table 11 indicates that change in stock-based compensation (SBC) is 
positively related to subsequent change in performance. Those firms with increased SBC 
following spinoffs demonstrate an increase of 0.74% (0.24%) in industry-adjusted operating 
performance in year +3 (year +2) relative to year +1 whereas those with decreased SBC 
demonstrate a reduction of -0.80% (-0.01%). The positive relationship between SBC and 
performance is consistent with the hypothesis. However, the results using delta show that 
those firms with increased delta perform worse (better) in year +2 (year +3) relative to year 
+1. Two possible explanations arise. First, individual delta does not capture pay-performance 
relationship effectively due to the lack of observation. Second, overall CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity may not be as effective as SBC in terms of providing incentives for performance 
improvement. 
Next, I conduct a multivariate analysis by estimating the following equation. 
 
iiiii XInfoComptROA εββββ +⋅++−Δ⋅++−Δ⋅+=+Δ 3210 )1,1()1,1(),1( , 
 
where ),1( tROAi +Δ  is the proxy for change in operating performance of parent firms around 
the spinoff and is obtained by measuring industry-adjusted changes in return on assets from 
the first fiscal year after the spinoff to the second year ( t  = 2) or the third year ( t  = 3). 
)1,1( +−Δ iComp  is the change in a compensation structure from the pre-spinoff to the post-
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spinoff period. Each of the two measures of compensation structure described in the previous 
section is applied, respectively. )1,1( +−Δ iInfo  is the change in informativeness of stock 
prices of parent firms from the pre-spinoff to the post-spinoff period. Informativeness is 
measured by firm-specific return variation (MM) introduced in the first essay. For all 
regressions, the main variables, compensation structure, informativeness, and operating 
performance, are trimmed at the 1 % level to prevent outliers from influencing the results. 
iX  is the set of control variables:  pre-spinoff level of informativeness, changes in beta, 
changes in leverage, size, and 3-day excess return around spinoff announcements. These 
variables are reasonable choices to explain the change in operating performance (for more 
details on the control variables, please refer to the appendix).  
For the hypothesis to hold, 1β  must be greater than zero. This regression also provides a 
horse race between compensation and informativeness measures. If 1β  is positive and 
significant and 2β  is not, the relationship between informativeness and performance 
suggested in the first essay may be interpreted as a mere spurious relationship in that the 
change in compensation can explain the performance change explained by price 
informativeness. 
Panel B of table 11 reports multivariate regressions results using performance changes 
from year +1 to year +2 and those from year +1 to year +3 as a dependent variable, 
respectively. Change in SBC around the spinoff is positively and significantly related to 
subsequent change in operating performance for both dependent variables, suggesting that 
additional stock-based compensation following the spinoff provides an incentive for a CEO 
to exert more effort to improve operating performance. As was the case in univariate analysis, 
delta does not have any significant impact on subsequent performance. In addition to the 
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possible reasons listed following univariate analysis, these weak results using delta may also, 
in part, have to do with the insignificant change in delta around the spinoff. The coefficient 
for change in informativeness measure stays positive and significant throughout all four 
regressions, indicating that the effect of price informativeness on firm performance is not 
replaced by compensation structure.  
 
5.2  Interaction between CEO compensation structure and price informativeness 
In this subsection, I estimate the following equation to test the hypothesis that changes in 
informativeness around the spinoff and subsequent changes in performance have a stronger 
association when a greater proportion of CEO compensation is tied to stock performance.  
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To evaluate the potential interaction between informativeness and compensation structure 
suggested in hypothesis, )1,1()1,1( +−Δ⋅+−Δ ii InfoComp , a product term between the two 
variables is introduced. In addition, pre-spinoff level of compensation structure measure is 
included as a control variable. 
Table 12 reports regressions results using )2,1( ++ΔROA  and )3,1( ++ΔROA  as a 
dependent variable, respectively. The coefficient for change in stock-based compensation 
stays positive for both regressions (regressions 1 and 3) although it is insignificant in 
regression 1. The product of informativeness and SBC, the term of interest in the hypothesis, 
is not significant. Moreover, its sign flips from one regression to the other. When delta is 
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utilized as the compensation structure measure, both changes in delta and the interaction term 
are insignificant. Informativeness measure is positive and significant throughout all 
regressions. Control variables are largely insignificant with the exception of pre-spinoff level 
of informativeness. 
The evidence so far provides two implications. First, while performance-based 
compensation seems to be an effective tool to induce managers to improve performance, it is 
not related to the association between price informativeness and firm performance. Second, 
the results show that the association between informativeness and performance stays positive 
and significant, controlling for the change in compensation structure around the spinoff. 
These results provide additional support for the findings from the first part. 
 
5.3  Robustness checks 
In this subsection, I check for the robustness of the results by exploring performance-
sensitive measures alternative to CEO compensation. I introduce two measures of 
performance-related CEO wealth. First measure is named stockholding and is defined as a 
ratio of dollar values of shares owned by a CEO to the value of the CEO’s total 
compensation. This measure estimates the value of CEO’s wealth tied to the firm stock 
performance. Stockholding complements the previously described compensation structure 
measures in that stockholding, being performance-sensitive wealth, gives a CEO an incentive 
to exert all his effort even when the firm does not provide him with performance-sensitive 
compensation. Pre-spinoff (post-spinoff) stockholding is the average of year -4 through year 
0 (year +1 through year +3). Change in stockholding is post-spinoff stockholding minus pre-
spinoff stockholding. 
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The second measure is ownership and is defined as the ratio of the number of shares 
owned by a CEO to the number of shares outstanding. A significant ownership of the firm 
may provide CEOs with an incentive to improve the firm performance as higher CEO 
ownership reduces possible agency conflict presented in Jensen and Meckling (1976). CEO 
ownership of the firm implies that the CEO’s utility is in accordance with the shareholders’ 
utilities. Thus, a CEO holding a sizable portion of the firm equity will exert more efforts to 
maximize the firm value even when incentive compensation scheme is not present. 
Panel A of table 13 reports that the changes in stockholding and ownership around the 
spinoff are negative. This may seem counter-intuitive especially because the results on SBC 
suggest that the firms increase stock-based compensation following spinoffs. However, one 
should note that the stock and option grants are not reflected in CEO ownership immediately 
due to the restriction on exercise: restricted stocks typically vest over 5-year period and 
options are generally granted with a 10-year duration and vest over a 3-5 year period. 
Furthermore, these grants are forfeited if the CEO leaves the firm before the restrictions lapse. 
In fact, the reduction in stockholding and ownership is a mere artifact caused by the high rate 
of CEO turnover around the spinoff. 55% (66%) of the firms in post-1991 data replace their 
CEO between year 0 and +1 (year -1 and +1) (the tables are not reported here). CEO 
ownership is highly and positively correlated with his tenure. Therefore, a new CEO 
appointed following a spinoff tends to have much lower ownership of the stocks.19 It seems 
                                                 
19 One may argue that the significant rise in SBC following the spinoff may be an artifact caused by CEO 
turnover around the spinoff. Firms tend to provide more stock-based compensation in an early stage of a CEO’s 
tenure and less in later stage. As a reason for this behavior, Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien (2000) argue that “when 
CEOs hold a large fraction of their firms’ equity, the demand for further stock-based compensation is likely to 
be reduced, since the interests of CEOs and shareholders are relatively aligned already.” Empirically, this 
negative correlation is supported by Mehran (1995) and Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien (2000). However, a simple 
test shows that the change in SBC for the firms without CEO turnover around the spinoff is not significantly 
different from the change in SBC for those with CEO turnover. 
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that this artificial reduction in stockholding and ownership makes the test results based on 
these two measures unreliable. 
Panel B of table 13 reports multivariate regressions results using )2,1( ++ΔROA  and 
)3,1( ++ΔROA  as a dependent variable. Neither of the two measures has a significant impact 
on subsequent performance. It is possible that the artificial change in CEO 
stockholding/ownership associated with CEO turnover around the spinoff may dilute the true 
impact of increased stockholding or ownership on firm performance. The coefficient for 
change in informativeness measure stays positive and significant throughout all eight 
regressions, implying that the effect of price informativeness on firm performance is not 
replaced by the wealth-related measures. 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper empirically investigates the role of stock price informativeness in the real 
sector using a sample of corporate spinoffs from 1975 to 2001. The paper consists of two 
parts. In the first part, I examine the impact of stock price informativeness on a firm’s 
managerial decisions and operating performance. I find a strong, positive association 
between changes in informativeness of stock prices around the spinoff and changes in 
operating performance of parent firms from the first year after the spinoff to the second or the 
third year. Furthermore, those firms with increased informativeness make better adjustments 
to achieve investment efficiency following the spinoff, suggesting that managerial 
investment decisions serve as one of the channels through which informative stock price 
contribute to operating performance. The findings are robust to a number of sensitivity 
checks. On a general level, I adopt Heckman’s two-stage estimation procedure for the test of 
sample selection bias. The introduction of a self-selection correction term does not affect the 
findings. On more microscopic level, I examine three alternative explanations regarding 
performance changes proposed in the spinoff literature. I confirm the effect of stock price 
informativeness, taking into consideration the effect of changes in corporate focus, of the 
dismantling of internal capital markets, and of the removal of poorly performing subsidiaries.  
In the second part of the study, I study the structural changes in CEO compensation around 
the spinoff and examine how compensation structure relates to the association between stock 
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price informativeness and operating performance established in the first part. I find that firms 
increase the proportion of stock-based compensation significantly following the spinoff. This 
change in stock-based compensation is positively related to the subsequent change in 
operating performance, suggesting that stock-based compensation is an effective tool in 
structuring managerial incentives. I also test whether stock-based compensation helps induce 
managers to study the stock price as a way to improve performance. The results suggest there 
is no significant interaction between informativeness and compensation structure. 
Throughout all regressions, the association between informativeness and performance stays 
positive and significant, providing additional support for the findings from the first part. My 
findings provide one of the first pieces of evidence supporting the view that information 
production in capital markets not only plays a role in financial sector but also contributes to 
the real sector. 
 44
Table 1: 
 
Summary Statistics: Spinoff Data 
 
Panel A reports the distribution of 268 spinoffs by year. Panel B reports three summary statistics for parent 
companies. Market value of parent is measured at the end of the month of spinoff distribution. Total assets are 
the value at the end of first fiscal year after spinoff distribution. Relative size of parent is calculated as the total 
assets of the parent in year +1 divided by sum of total assets of parent and that of subsidiary in year +1. Missing 
values were generated for subsidiaries whose COMPUSTAT data was unavailable. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of Spinoff by Year 
Year Number  Year Number 
1975 3  1989 9 
1976 2  1990 8 
1977 1  1991 8 
1978 1  1992 10 
1979 3  1993 15 
1980 7  1994 12 
1981 9  1995 13 
1982 8  1996 14 
1983 8  1997 22 
1984 12  1998 10 
1985 10  1999 18 
1986 6  2000 22 
1987 8  2001 17 
1988 12  Total 268 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Parent Firms  
  N Mean Median 
Market value (Million 1995 $) 268 4222.07 580.31 
Total assets (Million 1995 $)  268 5177.72 840.70 
Relative size of parents 226 0.7067 0.7634 
 45
Table 2: 
 
Changes in Informativeness and Operating Performance around Spinoffs 
 
Panel A reports changes in the firm-specific return variation (MM), changes in the firm-specific return variation 
(MI), and changes in the relative effective bid-ask spread (REBA) around spinoffs. Firm-specific return 
variation (MM) is the standard deviation of market model residuals. Firm-specific return variation (MI) is 
calculated by regressing firm return on market return and industry return and calculating the standard deviation 
of the regression residuals. Industry return is value-weighted return of all firms (excluding a sample firm) that 
have same 3-digit SIC code as the sample firm. REBA is calculated as two times the absolute difference 
between the transaction price and the midpoint of the quoted bid and ask outstanding at the time of the trade, 
divided by the quote midpoint. Quotes were lagged 5 seconds to mitigate nonsynchronous recording of trades 
and quotes. The pre-spinoff period for the informativeness measures is the 250 trading days ending 50 days 
prior to the first public announcement of spinoffs, and the post-spinoff period is the 250 days beginning 50 days 
after the dates of spinoff distribution. Panel B reports correlation among the three information measures. Panel 
C reports raw ROA and industry-adjusted ROA of parent firms from year +1 to year +3, where year 0 is defined 
as the year of spinoff distribution. Industry-adjusted ROA is obtained by subtracting matching firm ROA from 
parent firm ROA, where the matching firm is the firm that has the same four-digit SIC code as the sample firm 
and is closest to it in market value of equity in the month of spinoff. Sample sizes vary because some firms do 
not have matching firms.  
 
Panel A: Changes in Informativeness around Spinoffs 
  N   Mean Median St.dev. 
Firm-specific return variation (MM)     
Pre-spinoff 268   0.0244 0.0218 0.0128 
Post-spinoff 267   0.0280 0.0242 0.0157 
Changes 267   0.0036*** 0.0026*** 0.0127 
     
Firm-specific return variation (MI)     
Pre-spinoff 266   0.0241 0.0213 0.0128 
Post-spinoff 265   0.0277 0.0236 0.0158 
Changes 264   0.0036*** 0.0026*** 0.0127 
     
REBA      
Pre-spinoff 205   0.0133 0.0074 0.0263 
Post-spinoff 214   0.0179 0.0106 0.0206 
Changes 205   0.0042** 0.0010*** 0.0261 
 
Panel B: Correlation among Information Measures 
  Firm-specific return variation (MI) REBA 
Firm-specific return variation (MM) 0.9971*** 0.2492*** 
Firm-specific return variation (MI)  0.2601*** 
 
Panel C: Operating Performance of Parent Firms from Year +1 to Year +3 
   ROA    Industry-adjusted ROA  
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median 
Year +1 268 0.1297 0.1321   246    0.0378***  0.0150*** 
Year +2 267 0.1326 0.1362  239    0.0551***  0.0211*** 
Year +3 252 0.1238 0.1243   204    0.0592***  0.0187*** 
 
* Significant at the 0.10 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 3: 
 
Summary Statistics: CEO compensation 
 
This table reports median CEO compensation by year. Total compensation (unit: thou $) is the sum of salary, 
bonus, restricted stock grant, option grant, long-term incentive payouts, and all other payments. Stock-based 
compensation (unit: thou $) is the sum of restricted stock grant and option grant. Stock-based comp. (%) is 
defined as the ratio of the sum of restricted stock grants and option grants to total compensation.  
 
year 
Number of 
obs. 
Total Comp. 
(thou $) 
Stock-based 
comp. (thou $) 
Stock-based 
comp. (%) 
Proportion of firms 
with stock comp. (%) 
1977 5 188.15 0 0 40.0 
1978 13 216.3 0 0 15.4 
1979 17 242.5 0 0 41.2 
1980 29 228.434 0 0 37.9 
1981 39 324.805 0 0 15.4 
1982 50 265.062 0 0 32.0 
1983 51 350.004 0 0 30.2 
1984 41 396.622 0 0 26.8 
1985 43 462.172 0 0 39.5 
1986 38 570.624 0 0 47.4 
1987 58 673.913 50.264 10.7 55.2 
1988 55 714.94 0 0 45.5 
1989 47 695.087 0 0 42.6 
1990 39 757.973 96.845 17.1 61.5 
1991 34 906.717 210.198 22.3 67.7 
1992 44 1343.56 235.589 20.7 70.5 
1993 60 2081.55 385.208 25.1 80.0 
1994 62 2126.69 515.842 28 71.0 
1995 65 2734.98 651.899 26.2 76.9 
1996 70 3939.81 1890.6 49.6 87.1 
1997 83 3300.33 1001.23 40.9 78.3 
1998 74 4125 1873.66 47.3 86.5 
1999 72 4268.65 2096.57 50.1 87.5 
2000 61 5076.68 2819.9 58 78.7 
2001 51 4581.72 1853.23 49.6 82.4 
2002 44 3984.12 2043.42 50.5 84.1 
2003 34 3839.84 2320.35 55.6 85.3 
2004 13 4888.44 2016.32 40.8 92.3 
All years 1292 1418.46 264.497 22.6 63.7 
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Table 4: 
 
Summary Statistics: Measures of Compensation Structure 
 
SBC is the stock-based compensation. Pre-spinoff (post-spinoff) SBC is the average of year -4 through year 0 
(year +1 through year +3). Change in SBC is post-spinoff SBC minus pre-spinoff SBC. Pre-spinoff and post-
spinoff stockholding and ownership are calculated in the same way. Delta measures how responsive CEO 
compensation is to the firm’s stock performance and is obtained by estimating the coefficient in the following 
regression: ∆ (CEO total compensation)t = a + b·∆ (shareholder wealth) t. 
 
 N       Mean Min Q1   Median Q3 Max 
SBC        
pre-spinoff 198     0.25776 0 0.03437   0.23518 0.40468 0.88141 
post spinoff 212     0.29689 0 0.03896   0.27950 0.49642 0.97163 
changes 196     0.04292*** -0.47932 -0.06801   0.01211*** 0.15693 0.75574 
        
Delta        
pre-spinoff 155     0.00166 -0.02285 -0.00059   0.00001 0.00091 0.09311 
post spinoff 174    -0.00443 -0.56250 -0.00108   0.00019 0.00191 0.18851 
changes 135    -0.00916* -0.61647 -0.00325  -0.00001 0.00227 0.05846 
 
* Significant at the 0.10 level; *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
Table 5: 
Regressions Results: Univariate Analysis 
This table reports Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation results using three informativeness measures. First measure is the change in the standard 
deviation of market model residuals from pre-spinoff to post-spinoff. Second measure is the change in the firm-specific return variation and is constructed by 
regressing firm return on market return and industry return and calculating the standard deviation of the regression residuals. Industry return is the value-
weighted returns of all firms (excluding the sample firm) that have the same 3-digit SIC code as the sample firm. The last information measure is the change in 
the relative effective bid-ask spread (REBA) from pre-spinoff to post-spinoff. The pre-spinoff period is defined as the 250 trading days ending 50 days prior to 
the first public announcement of a spinoff and the post-spinoff period is defined as the 250 days beginning 50 days after the date of spinoff distribution. The 
dependent variables are changes in industry-adjusted ROA of parent firms from year +1 to +2 and from year +1 to year +3, where year 0 is defined as the year of 
spinoff distribution. Sample sizes vary because of missing COMPUSTAT data or missing Trades and Quotes data. t-statistics are in parentheses. White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are utilized for all regressions. 
 
    Δ ROA (+1,+2)  Δ ROA (+1,+3) 
  Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3  Reg. 4 Reg. 5 Reg. 6 
Intercept         0.0077       0.0077       0.0074        0.0043       0.0039      –0.0060 
  (1.18) (1.19) (0.81)  (0.38) (0.35) (–0.44) 
Δ Firm-specific return variation (MM)       2.3962*          3.8713**   
  (1.69)    (1.95)   
Δ Firm-specific return variation (MI)        2.5554*          3.9847*  
   (1.73)    (1.90)  
Δ REBA          2.0030**           1.7795** 
      (2.03)    (2.29) 
N  232 230 178  196 194 153 
Adj. R2   0.0306 0.0336 0.0408  0.0453 0.0465 0.0283 
 
* Significant at the 0.10 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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 Table 6: 
  
Regression Results: Multivariate Analysis 
This table reports multivariate analysis results. The dependent variables are changes in industry-adjusted ROA of parent firms from year +1 to +2 and from year 
+1 to year +3, where year 0 is defined as the year of spinoff distribution. Control variables include systematic return variation (for first two information measures 
only), change in leverage from year –1 to year +1, change in beta (a coefficient of market return variable in market model regression), size (log of total assets in 
the first fiscal year after spinoff distributions), and 3-day excess return around spinoff announcements. Leverage is calculated by dividing total debt by total 
assets, where total debt is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities. Excess return is calculated using market model and value-weighted market 
returns. Sample sizes vary because of missing COMPUSTAT data or missing Trades and Quotes data. t-statistics are in parentheses. White’s heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are utilized for all regressions. 
 
  Δ ROA (+1,+2)   Δ ROA (+1,+3) 
 Reg. 1 (MM) Reg. 2 (MI) Reg. 3 (REBA)  Reg. 4 (MM) Reg. 5 (MI) Reg. 6 (REBA) 
Intercept      –0.0794      –0.0834        0.0622       –0.0214      –0.0160        0.0728 
 (–1.20) (–1.17) (0.95)  (–0.30) (–0.21) (0.78) 
Δ Informativeness of stock price        3.8634**        4.1078**        2.2127**         4.5795**        4.7583**        1.7455** 
 (2.11) (2.16) (2.18)  (2.22) (2.24) (2.23) 
Pre-spinoff Informativeness        2.5421        2.5487      –0.3525         1.6042        1.4095      –3.0214 
 (1.43) (1.38) (–0.51)  (1.09) (0.91) (–1.17) 
Δ Systematic variation      –1.9223      –2.0189*        –1.5878      –1.3796  
 (–1.45) (–1.67)   (–0.84) (–0.90)  
Pre-spinoff systematic variation      –0.6779      –0.3661          0.2685        0.6542  
 (–0.42) (–0.45)   (0.10) (0.53)  
Δ Beta        0.0194        0.0194        0.0469**         0.0295        0.0304        0.0558** 
 (1.17) (1.19) (2.31)  (1.47) (1.56) (2.4) 
Δ Leverage        0.0346        0.0326      –0.1225**         0.0750        0.0746      –0.1087 
 (0.48) (0.45) (–2.11)  (0.84) (0.85) (–1.47) 
Size        0.0042        0.0048      –0.0065       –0.0034      –0.0038      –0.0085 
 (0.84) (0.86) (–0.78)  (–0.46) (–0.48) (–0.81) 
Excess return      –0.0375      –0.0389      –0.0324         0.1334        0.1246        0.3868* 
  (–0.19) (–0.19) (–0.13)  (0.73) (0.67) (1.70) 
N 208 207 159  175 174 136 
Adj. R2 0.1141 0.1202 0.1383  0.1216 0.1224 0.1782 
49 
Table 7: 
 
Industry-adjusted Investments around Spinoffs 
 
This table reports mean and median pre-spinoff and post-spinoff industry-adjusted investments as well as change in investments around the spinoff. Investment 
level is reported for the full sample and four subgroups, which are formed based on the firms’ pre-spinoff levels of industry-adjusted investment opportunities 
(Q) and industry-adjusted investment (I). Within each subgroup, industry-adjusted investments of information-increasing firms and information-decreasing firms 
are compared. Industry-adjusted investment is defined as the sample firm’s investment minus its matching firm’s investment. Investment is capital expenditure 
divided by sales. Q is Tobin’s average Q, which is defined as market value of total assets divided by book value of total assets, where market value of total assets 
is book value of total assets plus market value of common equity minus book value of common equity minus deferred taxes. ΔInfo is changes in the 
informativeness around the spinoff, and the information measure utilized here is the firm-specific return variation (MM). Pre-spinoff values are averaged over 
year –1 and year –2. Post-spinoff values are averaged over year +1 and year +2.  
 
  (1) Q > 0, I > 0  (2) Q < 0, I < 0  (3) Q  >0, I < 0  (4) Q < 0, I > 0 
  
Full 
sample ΔInfo > 0 ΔInfo < 0  ΔInfo > 0 ΔInfo < 0  ΔInfo > 0 ΔInfo < 0  ΔInfo > 0 ΔInfo < 0 
             
Mean  –0.0220*   0.0647***    0.0820**   –0.1173***  –0.0940**   –0.1000*** –0.0800***    0.0572***    0.0900***  
Median  –0.0019*   0.0262***    0.0348***  –0.0405***  –0.0472***  –0.0616***  –0.0496***    0.0258***    0.0425***  
             
             
Mean  –0.0292   0.0489    0.0651**   –0.0691***  –0.2517   –0.0434***  –0.0648*     0.0262**    0.0875  
Median  –0.0088**   0.0163    0.0127*   –0.0327***  –0.0143**   –0.0344***  –0.0269**     0.0188**    0.0347*  
             
             
Mean   –0.0073 –0.0159  –0.0169     0.0483*  –0.1577     0.0566**    0.0153   –0.0311**  –0.0025  
Median  –0.0014 –0.0140*  –0.0252**     0.0071*    0.0117*     0.0150*    0.0017   –0.0093***    0.0004  
             
N 223 30 18  47 26  30 17  29 26 
 
* Significant at the 0.10 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 8: 
 
Heckman’s Two-stage Estimation 
This table reports results of Heckman’s two-stage estimation. Sample firms and matching firms are pooled to 
for the first-stage estimation. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of total assets divided by book value of total 
assets, where market value of total assets is book value of total assets plus market value of common equity 
minus book value of common equity minus deferred taxes. Investment level is calculated by dividing capital 
expenditure by sales. Sample sizes vary because of missing COMPUSTAT data. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Panel A: First-stage PROBIT Estimation 
   Coefficient z-statistic P>|z| 
Constant     1.1558    2.45  0.01 
St. Dev. of ROAs   –3.7841  –1.28  0.20 
Tobin's Q     0.1050    1.28  0.20 
Investment level     0.1845    0.30  0.76 
Firm-specific variation  –13.3277  –1.76  0.08 
Systematic variation      7.6178    0.44  0.66 
ROA year –3   –2.8195  –2.33  0.02 
ROA year –2   –5.4948  –3.49  0.00 
ROA year –1   –1.1826  –0.95  0.34 
Number of segments     0.2986    5.25  0.00 
Leverage   –0.7583  –1.20  0.23 
Size   –0.1199  –2.18  0.03 
N      327 
Wald Statistic     31.85 
 
Panel B: Second-stage OLS Estimation 
  Δ ROA (+1,+2)  Δ ROA (+1,+3) 
  Reg. 1 (MM) 
Reg. 2 
(REBA)  
Reg. 3  
(MM) 
Reg. 4 
(REBA) 
Intercept    –0.1068*     –0.0009          0.0221        0.1319* 
      (–1.74)      (–0.02)         (0.26)        (1.65) 
Lambda    –0.0096       0.0336**       –0.0772***      –0.0343 
      (–0.49)       (1.96)        (–2.98)       (–1.34) 
Δ Informativeness of stock price      5.1242***       1.4451**         5.3907***        1.3522* 
      (4.20)       (2.45)         (3.35)        (1.87) 
Pre-spinoff Informativeness      2.8686***     –1.2183         1.709      –4.0403** 
      (2.59)      (–1.22)         (1.13)        (–2.40) 
Δ Systematic variation    –1.5607        –1.2107  
     (–0.78)         (–0.47)  
Pre-spinoff systematic variation      0.0696          1.0283  
      (0.03)          (0.28)  
Δ Beta      0.0018       0.027**         0.0105        0.0409** 
      (0.12)       (2.35)         (0.54)        (2.16) 
Δ Leverage      0.0377     –0.0346         0.0863      –0.0795 
      (0.61)      (–0.63)         (1.06)       (–0.99) 
Size      0.0059     –0.0021       –0.0055      –0.0141* 
      (0.92)      (–0.36)        (–0.62)       (–1.64) 
Excess return      0.3110**       0.5133***         0.2639        0.6636*** 
       (2.15)       (3.77)          (1.33)        (3.31) 
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Table 9: 
 
Corporate Focus and Spinoffs 
 
Panel A reports changes in the industry-adjusted ROA from year +1 to year +2 and from year +1 to year +3 for 
focus-improving and non-focus-improving spinoffs. A spinoff is focus-improving if the parent and subsidiary 
have different two-digit SIC codes. A firm is excluded from the categorization if it spins off more than one 
subsidiary and one subsidiary has the same two-digit SIC code as the parent and the other s do not. The last row 
reports the difference in performance between focus-improving parents and non-focus-improving parents. Panel 
B presents changes in the industry-adjusted ROA for information-increasing and information-decreasing 
spinoffs. Two informativeness measures are used for the comparison: changes in the firm-specific return 
variation (MM) and changes in the relative effective bid-ask spread (REBA). Panel C reports regression results. 
The dependent variables are ROA (+1, +2) and ROA (+1, +3). Focus is an indicator variable that equals 1 for 
focus-improving spinoffs and 0 for non-focus-improving spinoffs. Regressions 2 and 5 employ the firm-specific 
return variation (MM) and regressions 3 and 6 use the REBA as the informativeness measure, respectively. t-
statistics are in parentheses. White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are utilized for all regressions. 
 
Panel A: Changes in Industry-adjusted ROA and Corporate Focus 
  ROA(+1,+2)  ROA(+1,+3) 
  N    Mean    Median  N    Mean    Median 
Focus-improving 141    0.0286**    0.0035*   127    0.0318*    0.0093 
Non-focus-improving 86    0.0052    0.0004  67  –0.0170  –0.0051 
Difference      0.0234    0.0031        0.0488*    0.0144 
 
Panel B: Changes in Industry-adjusted ROA and Informativeness 
  ROA(+1,+2)  ROA(+1,+3) 
  N    Mean    Median  N      Mean    Median 
Firm-specific return variation (MM) as the information measure         
Information-increasing 152    0.0364**    0.0105**  129     0.0306     0.0101 
Information-decreasing 89  –0.0171  –0.0068*  77   –0.0194   –0.0098 
Difference     0.0535***    0.0173***       0.0500*     0.0199** 
        
REBA as the information measure     
Information-increasing 113    0.0335    0.0014  97     0.0258     0.0093 
Information-decreasing 71  –0.0096  –0.0002  55   –0.0328   –0.0098 
Difference      0.0431**    0.0016*         0.0586**     0.0191* 
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Panel C: Regression Results  
  Δ ROA (+1,+2)   Δ ROA (+1,+3) 
 
Reg. 1 
 
Reg. 2 
(MM) 
Reg. 3 
(REBA)  
Reg. 4 
 
Reg. 5 
(MM) 
Reg. 6 
(REBA) 
Intercept   0.0225  –0.0756   0.0778   0.0112 –0.0017    0.1142 
 (1.22) (–1.22) (1.02)  (0.51) (–0.02) (0.99) 
Focus –0.0070  –0.0019   0.0012  0.0125 –0.0042  –0.0049 
 (–0.34) (–0.11) (0.06)  (0.45) (–0.17) (–0.17) 
Δ Informativeness      3.9216**   2.1352**     4.2946**    1.3943** 
  (2.18) (1.94)   (2.04) (2.08) 
Pre-spinoff informativeness    2.6385 –0.7797     1.4064  –4.6427 
  (1.45) (–0.65)   (0.89) (–1.46) 
Δ Systematic variation   –2.0085    –1.6267  
  (–1.49)    (–0.86)  
Pre-spinoff sys. variation   –0.7761      0.1690  
  (–0.47)    (0.06)  
Δ Beta     0.0201   0.0483**     0.0300    0.0594** 
  (1.19) (2.35)   (1.46) (2.40) 
Δ Leverage     0.0236 –0.1221**     0.0562  –0.1124 
  (0.33) (–2.10)   (0.61) (–1.46) 
Size     0.0039 –0.0079   –0.0047  –0.0116 
  (0.75) (–0.92)   (–0.61) (–1.03) 
Excess return   –0.0557 –0.0448     0.1517    0.4085* 
    (–0.27) (–0.18)   (0.81) (1.77) 
N 218 199 153  184 168 132 
Adj. R2   0.0006    0.1158   0.1373  0.0010   0.1145    0.1830 
 
* Significant at the 0.10 level; ** Significance at the 0.05 level; *** Significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 10: 
 
Operating Performance of Subsidiaries 
 
Panel A reports raw ROA and industry-adjusted ROA of the spun-off subsidiaries from year –1 to year +3 
excluding the year of the spinoff distribution. Panel B presents the correlations between the post-spinoff 
performance changes of parents and the pre-spinoff performance and the post-spinoff performance changes of 
subsidiaries.  
 
Panel A: Operating Performance of Subsidiary Firms from Year –1 to Year +3 
  ROA   Industry-adjusted ROA 
  N       Mean Median   N     Mean    Median 
Year –1 157    –0.0939 0.1376  147   –0.2218     0.0253 
Year +1 223      0.0908 0.1248  202     0.0475     0.0133 
Year +2 206      0.0748 0.1228  186   –0.0209   –0.0068 
Year +3 187      0.0794 0.1153   158   –0.0444**   –0.0061 
 
Panel B: Correlations between Operating Performance of Parents and Subsidiaries 
  Δ ROA (+1,+2) of parent Δ ROA (+1,+3) of parent 
ROA (Year –1) of subsidiary   0.0202 –0.0329 
Δ ROA (+1,+2) of subsidiary –0.0411 –0.0375 
Δ ROA (+1,+3) of subsidiary   0.0481   0.0645 
 
** Significant at the 0.05 level.  
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Table 11: 
 
Compensation Structure and Operating Performance 
 
The dependent variables are changes in industry-adjusted ROA of parent firms from year +1 to +2 and from 
year +1 to year +3, where year 0 is defined as the year of spinoff distribution. Each of the two compensation 
structure measures is used as an independent variable, respectively. Informativeness measure utilized is firm-
specific return variation (MM). Control variables include changes in informativeness, pre-spinoff level of 
informativeness, change in leverage from year –1 to year +1, change in beta (a coefficient of market return 
variable in market model regression), size (log of total assets in the first fiscal year after spinoff distributions), 
and 3-day excess return around spinoff announcements. Leverage is calculated by dividing total debt by total 
assets, where total debt is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities. Excess return is calculated 
using market model and value-weighted market returns. t-statistics are in parentheses. White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are utilized for all regressions. 
 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis  
  ROA(1, 2)  ROA(1, 3) 
  ∆Comp.< 0 ∆Comp.≥ 0  ∆Comp.< 0 ∆Comp.≥ 0 
SBC -0.00011 0.00242  -0.00804 0.00737 
Delta 0.00618 0.00023  -0.00230 0.01096 
Stockholding 0.00172 -0.00016  0.00583 -0.00280 
Ownership -0.00097 0.00199  -0.01268 0.00861 
 
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis 
  ∆ROA (1, 2)   ∆ROA (1, 3) 
Reg. 1 Reg. 2  Reg. 3 Reg. 4 
 (SBC) (Delta)   (SBC) (Delta) 
Intercept -0.0251 -0.0132  -0.0364 -0.0352 
 (-0.57) (-0.24)  (-0.51) (-0.43) 
∆ Compensation 0.0585* -0.3019  0.1080** -0.1182 
 (1.71) (-0.78)  (2.05) (-0.32) 
∆ Informativeness  3.6918** 4.8222**  4.7614** 4.3706* 
 (1.97) (2.07)  (2.26) (1.70) 
Pre-spinoff Comp. 3.4978* 5.4263**  4.8877** 4.7210* 
 (1.85) (2.30)  (2.38) (1.75) 
Δ Leverage 0.0398 0.0116  0.0617 0.0730 
 (0.51) (0.14)  (0.73) (0.77) 
Δ Beta -0.0218 -0.0318  -0.0510* -0.0622 
 (-1.21) (-1.28)  (-1.73) (-1.33) 
Size -0.0018 -0.0061  -0.0016 0.0012 
 (-0.39) (-0.87)  (-0.22) (0.14) 
Excess Return -0.1245 -0.0665  0.0740 0.1559 
 (-0.56) (-0.27)  (0.28) (0.49) 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.0926 0.1452   0.0782 0.0339 
N 158 111   133 96 
 
* Significant at the 0.10 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 12: 
 
Regressions including an interaction term between Compensation Structure and Informativeness 
 
The dependent variables are changes in industry-adjusted ROA of parent firms from year +1 to +2 and from 
year +1 to year +3, where year 0 is defined as the year of spinoff distribution. Each of the two compensation 
structure measures is used as an independent variable, respectively. ∆Info·∆Comp is the product of a 
compensation variable and an informativeness variable. Informativeness measure utilized is firm-specific return 
variation (MM). Control variables include changes in informativeness, pre-spinoff level of informativeness, 
change in leverage from year –1 to year +1, change in beta (a coefficient of market return variable in market 
model regression), size (log of total assets in the first fiscal year after spinoff distributions), and 3-day excess 
return around spinoff announcements. Leverage is calculated by dividing total debt by total assets, where total 
debt is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities. Excess return is calculated using market model 
and value-weighted market returns. t-statistics are in parentheses. White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors are utilized for all regressions. 
 
  ∆ROA (1, 2)   ∆ROA (1, 3) 
Reg. 1 Reg. 2  Reg. 3 Reg. 4 
 (SBC) (Delta)   (SBC) (Delta) 
Intercept -0.0435 -0.0080  -0.0971 -0.0240 
 (-0.73) (-0.14)  (-1.20) (-0.28) 
∆ Compensation 0.0353 0.8000  0.1031* -1.9860 
 (1.22) (0.94)  (1.68) (-1.45) 
∆ Info·∆ Comp 1.7536 -112.6570  -7.5228 192.6020 
 (0.41) (-1.36)  (-1.13) (1.23) 
Pre-spinoff Compensation -0.0448 -0.8200  -0.0928 -5.1990 
 (-0.82) (-0.31)  (-1.45) (-1.55) 
∆ Informativeness 3.7416* 4.5030*  5.4092** 5.0570* 
 (1.86) (1.81)  (2.37) (1.91) 
Pre-spinoff Informativeness 3.7672* 5.4170**  5.9047** 5.3500** 
 (1.73) (2.19)  (2.55) (1.98) 
Δ Leverage 0.0366 0.0160  0.0623 0.0750 
 (0.47) (0.19)  (0.75) (0.80) 
Δ Beta -0.0173 -0.0370  -0.0433 -0.0630 
 (-0.94) (-1.53)  (-1.52) (-1.42) 
Size 0.0009 -0.0060  0.0056 -0.0020 
 (0.16) (-0.69)  (0.72) (-0.17) 
Excess Return -0.1192 -0.0660  0.0968 0.1930 
 (-0.55) (-0.27)  (0.37) (0.61) 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.0863 0.1450   0.0814 0.0358 
N 158 111   133 96 
 
* Significant at the 0.10 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 13: 
 
Robustness Checks Using Additional Measures 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics: performance-sensitive wealth measures 
 N Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Stockholding       
pre-spinoff 194 74.34 0.02  1.12 4.07 14.46 7513.29 
post spinoff 208 61.25 0.00  0.76 2.21 7.32 5827.14 
changes 190 -10.95 -1686.15 -4.28    -0.45** 0.83 1865.78 
        
Ownership       
pre-spinoff 194       0.04123 0.00001 0.00104 0.00423 0.02699 0.82045 
post spinoff 209       0.03154 0.00000 0.00078 0.00334 0.01996 0.50557 
changes 191      -0.01095** -0.68008 -0.00574 -0.00018 0.00083 0.19439 
 
Panel B: Multivariate regression results 
  ∆ROA (1, 2)   ∆ROA (1, 3) 
Reg. 1 Reg. 2  Reg. 3 Reg. 4 
 (Stockholding) (Ownership)   (Stockholding) (Ownership) 
Intercept -0.0325 -0.0386  -0.0664 -0.0670 
 (-0.70) (-0.79)  (-0.89) (-0.88) 
∆ Compensation -0.0005 -0.3991  -0.0005 -0.5134 
 (-1.18) (-0.96)  (-1.05) (-0.96) 
∆ Informativeness  3.8164** 3.8997**  4.2228** 3.9089** 
 (2.13) (2.12)  (2.15) (2.32) 
Pre-spinoff Comp. 4.0695** 3.7149*  3.8379** 3.3437** 
 (2.05) (1.99)  (2.07) (2.15) 
Δ Leverage 0.0147 0.0200  0.0545 0.0565 
 (0.24) (0.32)  (0.86) (0.86) 
Δ Beta -0.0309* -0.0232  -0.0481 -0.0437 
 (-1.76) (-1.36)  (-1.63) (-1.54) 
Size -0.0004 -0.0002  0.0048 0.0056 
 (-0.10) (-0.03)  (0.68) (0.78) 
Excess Return -0.1162 -0.1302  0.1680 0.0968 
 (-0.51) (-0.58)  (0.65) (0.41) 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.1355 0.1265   0.0577 0.0727 
N 153 153   129 131 
 
* Significant at the 0.10 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Figure 1: 
 
Sequence of Events 
 
Change in informativeness is post-spinoff informativeness minus pre-spinoff informativeness. ROA (+1, +2) 
and ROA (+1, +3) are changes in operating performance and are measured by ROA for year +2 minus ROA 
year +1 and ROA year +3 minus ROA year +1, respectively. 
 
 
Fiscal Year 2 Fiscal Year 1 Fiscal Year 3
ROA Year +1 ROA Year +2 ROA Year +3
Fiscal Year 0
Post-spinoff 
Informativeness 
Spinoff 
Announcement 
Spinoff 
Distribution 
Pre-spinoff 
Informativeness 
  59
Figure 2: 
 
Performance Changes for Quartiles sorted by Changes in Informativeness 
 
Figure 2 shows median changes in informativeness around the spinoff and median changes in industry-adjusted 
operating performance from year +1 to year +3 for each quartile. Sample firms are sorted into four quartiles 
based on the magnitude of changes in informativeness, with quartile 1 corresponding to the firms experiencing 
the least improvement in informativeness around the spinoff. The firm-specific return variation (MM) is utilized 
as the informativeness measure.  
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Figure 3: 
 
CEO Compensation 
 
Following figures show the distribution of compensation and stock holding over time. All dollar values are 
converted to 1995 dollar values. Due to the strong right skewness of the data, median values are reported unless 
specified otherwise. 
 
 
 
Figure 3A: Median annual compensation (unit: $thou) 
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Figure 3B: Frequency of stock compensation  
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Figure 3C: Proportion of stock compensation (mean) 
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Appendix: 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Measure 
 
Systematic Variation  
 
 
 
Standard deviation of the return variations explained by market return (and 
industry return) 
Beta Coefficient of the market return variable in market model regressions 
 
Leverage  
 
Total debt divided by total assets, where total debt is the sum of long-term debt 
and debt in current liabilities. 
 
Size  
 
Log of the total assets of a parent firm at the end of the month of the spinoff 
distribution 
 
Excess Return 3-day announcement period abnormal return 
(estimated using market model and value-weighted market return) 
 
Return on asset (ROA) Operating cash flow (COMPUSTAT annual data item #13) divided by total assets 
(COMPUSTAT annual data item #6) 
 
Tobin’s Average Q  Market value of total assets divided by book value of total assets, where market 
value of total assets is book value of total assets plus market value of common 
equity minus book value of common equity minus deferred taxes. 
 
Investments (I) Capital expenditure divided by sales (Capital expenditure divided by total assets is 
also used as a measure of investment. Test results are similar to those using capital 
expenditure divided by sales and are not reported here.) 
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